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I. INTRODUCTION
The credit rating agencies are supposed to be gatekeepers to the public
securities markets. 1 As “gatekeepers,” they are reputational intermediaries in the
investment process. 2 Other gatekeepers include: independent auditors, credit
rating agencies, securities analysts, investment bankers, and attorneys. 3 The
function of these reputational intermediaries is to act as neutral third party advisors
to the investment process. 4 While these intermediaries are paid for their opinions
by one or more parties to a transaction, in theory the opinions will be neutral. This
is due to the thought that any resulting reputational damage from non-neutral
opinions would severely damage long-term profitability, in exchange for mere
short-term profits. 5
The rating agencies are very different from other gatekeepers, as they exist in
a position of profitable limbo somewhere between market journalist and state
authority. 6 They claim they are merely reputational intermediaries sought by
numerous market participants for neutral opinions on the safety of securities
products. 7 At the same time, they uniquely occupy a niche where government
regulation mandates that market participants utilize their ratings; they are, in fact,
selling compliance with official regulation.8 This puts them in a position of
incredible power 9 and provides them with little accountability. 10 With the recent
explosion of unregulated securities 11 and the ensuing near collapse of the financial

1

John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW.
1403, 1405 (2002).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See id. at 1406.
6
Christopher M. Bruner, States, Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes in
an Era of Economic Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 125, 168 (2008).
7
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1405.
8
Bruner, supra note 6, at 168 (“[U]nlike auditors, analysts, investment bankers, corporate
attorneys, stock exchanges, and others—[the agencies] literally regulate admission to bond markets, and
possess the power to articulate public policy in so doing, with no straightforward form of accountability
to constrain them.”).
9
As New York Times Columnist Thomas Friedman put it: “[t]here are two superpowers in the
world today in my opinion. There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The
United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your
bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who’s more powerful.” Interview by David Gergen
with Thomas Friedman, Columnist, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1996), available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/gergen/friedman.html.
10
Bruner, supra note 6. Conversely, auditors, for example, have historically had substantial
accountability through the courts. Id.
11
Namely, derivatives were made statutorily and were largely unregulated by the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Gwen Moran, Do Derivatives Need More Oversight?, ON WALL
ST., Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.onwallstreet.com/ows_issues/2009_1/do-derivatives-need-moreoversight2637051-1.html. Incidentally, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 was a
largely bi-partisan act which was introduced by both Republicans and Democrats and was passed by the
then Republican controlled House and Senate and was signed into law by President Clinton on
December 21, 2000. Karen Buck Burgess et al., The SEC Speaks in 2001: Recent Legislative
Developments Affecting the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission - DECEMBER 29, 2000,
1234 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 797, 801, 844, 846 (2001).
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markets, 12 it seems these agencies are perhaps not gatekeepers, but rather
mechanics, greasing the wheels of a giant runaway train of dangerous financial
products. 13
This article will explore the rating agencies’ role in this recent crisis and will
discuss the need for increased regulation or liability14 for the agencies to function
effectively. This comment will ask what is the most realistic way to accomplish
this. Part II is an introduction to who the rating agencies are and what they do. 15
Part III looks at how we got where we are and explores two common criticisms
against the agencies that even their former employees attest to. 16 Part IV navigates
recent responses, both by the agencies to criticism and by the government through
the SEC. 17 Part V looks at past liability exposure to the agencies and common
defenses they have raised. 18 There will also be some discussion of whether
legislation passed has changed anything, as well as a look at a common barrier to
litigation against the agencies. 19 Finally, Part VI offers the author’s own opinions
on where we go from here. 20
II. INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS
A. Who The Rating Agencies Are
While there are possibly 150 credit rating agencies worldwide, 21 only ten
agencies are currently registered with the SEC as a Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”). 22 Of the ten registered NRSROs,
only three really matter. 23 These three “major” credit rating agencies include
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”), 24 Standard & Poor’s (“S.&P.”),25

12

Soros Sees No Bottom for World Financial “Collapse,” REUTERS UK, Feb. 21, 2009,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUKTRE51K0AV20090221.
13
End of Wall Street: What Happened (The Wall Street Journal Video Jan. 5, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/video-center/the-end-of-wall-street.html. As Frank Raiter, former Managing
Director and Head of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings at Standard & Poor’s so aptly put
it, the rating agencies were greasing the wheels of this train which was powered by low interest rates,
driven by the investment banks, conducted by lenders and investment bankers, and ridden “standing
room only” by investors. Id.
14
Alternatively, there could be increased regulation and liability.
15
See infra Part II.
16
See infra Part III.
17
See infra Part IV.
18
See infra Part V.
19
See infra Part V.
20
See infra Part VI.
21
Alec Klein, Smoothing the Way for Debt Markets: Firms’ Influence Has Grown Along with
World’s Reliance on Bonds, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2004, at A18.
22
Elliott R. Curzon et al., SEC Proposes Rules for Registration of Credit Rating Agencies, 124
BANKING L.J. 438, 441-42 (2007).
23
Klein, supra note 21.
24
Moody’s is owned by Moody’s Corporation, which is a publicly traded corporation. NYSE
Listing Directory: Moody’s Corporation, http://www.nyse.com/ about/listed/mco.html (last visited Feb.
21, 2009).
25
Standard and Poor’s is a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., which is a publicly
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and Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”). 26 Moody’s and S.&P. are the largest, with each
respectively owning about forty percent of the credit rating markets. 27 Fitch is the
smallest of the three and is often considered a “tie-breaker” by investors when the
other two agencies have assigned similar, but not equal, ratings. 28
B. What the Agencies Do
An NRSRO can register in one or more categories with the SEC. These
categories include financial institutions; insurance companies; corporate issuers;
issuers of government, municipal, and foreign government securities; and assetbacked securities. 29 Within these categories, the NRSROs provide self-described
“opinions” in the form of ratings on creditworthiness. 30 The agencies create these
opinions by gathering and analyzing public and private information and reporting
the results in a letter, which generally distinguishes at a basic level between
investment grade and non-investment grade. 31 These opinions are highly valued
by investors when making investment decisions. 32 The ratings are valued because
they supposedly convey an evaluation of risk of non-payment and default
likelihood; 33 which directly affects how much an investor is willing to pay
according to his or her risk appetite. 34 A prime example of the importance
investors put on these ratings occurred on January 19, 1990, when Moody’s
lowered its debt rating on RJR-Nabisco, citing worries about the company’s cash
traded corporation. Standard & Poor’s, www.standardandpoors.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
26
Fitch is a private company. It is owned by Fitch Inc., which is often referred to as the Fitch
Group. Fitch Ratings Visual Timeline, http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/marcom/group_
timeline.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). Fitch Inc. is a majority-owned subsidiary of Fimalac, S.A., an
international business support services group headquartered in Paris, France.
About Fitch,
http://www.fitchratings.com/jsp/ creditdesk/AboutFitch.faces?context=1&detail=1 (last visited Feb. 21,
2009).
27
Klein, supra note 21.
28
Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 Wash. U.L.Q. 43, 60 (2004); Jeff Jewell &
Miles Livingston, A Comparison of Bond Ratings from Moody’s S&P and Fitch IBCA, 8 FIN. MKTS.,
INSTS. & I NSTRUMENTS 4, Jan. 2002, at 1, available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgibin/fulltext/119084174/PDFSTART.
29
Elliott R. Curzon et al., supra note 22.
30
See Hill, supra note 28, at 48.
31
SEC, Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2009). Ratings are further broken down into tiers and sub-tiers assigned as the agencies
determine rating worthiness. BondsOnline: Long Term Bond Ratings, http://www.bondsonline.com/
asp/research/bondratings.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). All use letter-based grading systems. Id.
S.&P.’s ratings, for example, range from AAA for the most financially stable companies to D for a
company in default. Amy Borrus et al., The Credit-Raters: How They Work and How They Might Work
Better, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Apr. 8, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_14/
b3777054.htm.
32
Borrus et al., supra note 31.
33
Gregory Husisian, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials?: An
Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability?, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 413 (1990). However, some
commentators argue that the rating agencies assign actually affect the cost of the capital themselves,
instead of merely revealing underlying risk. Id. at 411 n.1. Either way, investors take these ratings
seriously. When applied to a company, investors regard these ratings as a key measurement of the
company’s financial health. See Borrus et al., supra note 31. Some loans must be restructured or
repaid if an issuer’s credit rating falls below investment grade. Id.
34
See Borrus et al., supra note 31.
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flow while S.&P. affirmed an existing higher rating. 35 RJR-Nabisco’s bonds lost
twenty percent of their value within two days, cumulatively equaling several
hundred million dollars. 36
These opinions are not merely recognized by investors for private market
purposes. A large amount of government regulation mandates ratings assigned by
these agencies to be considered to meet official regulatory requirements. 37 These
requirements are extensive and include rating thresholds for banks, trust
companies, pension funds, insurance companies, and money market funds. 38 This
has led to a bit of a paradox: investors required by regulation to consider mere
“opinions.” 39
III. MOUNTING CRITICISM OF THE AGENCIES’ ACTIONS
A. How We Got Here
Among the many financial instruments rating agencies cover is securitized
loan pools. 40 One early failure attributed to the rating agencies was their assigning
faulty risk assessments to securitized loan pools composed of mortgages, known as
“mortgage-backed securities” (“MBS”). 41 Additionally, in the ensuing economic
downturn, the agencies failed to promptly downgrade troubled securities’ ratings42
and companies’ ratings, 43 even when it was clear the securities and companies
were troubled.
Failure by the credit rating agencies to assign accurate MBS and
collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) ratings was a key contributor to the current

35

Husisian, supra note 33, at 411.
Id.
37
Hill, supra note 28, at 53.
38
Id. Typically, regulation requires an investment grade “threshold” to be met through
encouragement of a requirement of investment grade debt to be held instead of debt that is less highly
rated or unrated. These preferences matter; for instance, the designation of “money market” fund for all
regulatory purposes generally requires a limit on short-term securities held to only the highest two
ratings categories by NRSROs. See Bruner, supra note 6, at 140. California’s Insurance Code limits
“excess funds investments” to only investment in the highest three ratings categories by an NRSRO. Id.
Additionally, large public pensions, such as CalPers, require ratings thresholds to be met. To
understand the extent the use of these “opinions” has reached, consider that the “Basel II” international
banking requirements have credit rating consideration requirements incorporated into their regulations.
Id. at 141.
39
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the agencies’ continuing contention that they are offering mere
opinions). According to their contention, one would think that nobody is actually required to look at
ratings.
40
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2046 (2007).
41
Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Rating Agency Heads Grilled by Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/economy/23rating.html.
42
Credit Crisis Hurts Rating Agencies, FORBES, Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/
08/13/credit-rating-crisis-oxford_0814oxfordanalytica.html (“Despite widespread awareness of
problems in the subprime sector, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s did not downgrade mortgage bonds
and related structured debt products until July 10, 2007.”).
43
Charlie Gasparino, Rating Agencies Hold Off Downgrading MBIA, Ambac, CNBC, Jan. 31,
2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/22932650.
36

138

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. III:I

economic crisis. 44 From the late 1990s through 2007, investment banks and other
issuers packaged residential loans directly and indirectly into MBSs, 45 and
CDOs. 46 In an effort to maximize profitability, these issuers created these
securities by dividing underlying risk of default into tranches, or levels of security,
each of which would be assigned a separate rating grade. 47 Often, the grade would
be based on a sliding scale of coupon rates, which in turn were based on the level
of credit protection afforded to the security. 48 Credit protection was designed to
shield the tranches from loss of interest and principal arising from defaults on the
loans backing these securities. The degree of credit protection assigned to a
tranche was known as its “credit enhancement.”49 Three forms of credit
enhancement include subordination, 50 over-collateralization, 51 excess spread,52
44
See Marie Leone, Subprime Slam: SEC Exposes Rating Agency Faults, CFO, July 8, 2008,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11699984?f=related; Drew Voros, Uncovering the Subprime Debacle,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, http http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20081230/
ai_n31157668/.
45
According to the SEC, mortgage-backed securities are defined as follows:
[D]ebt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage
loans, most commonly on residential property. Mortgage loans are purchased
from banks, mortgage companies, and other originators and then assembled into
pools by a governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity. The entity then
issues securities that represent claims on the principal and interest payments
made by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a process known as securitization.
SEC, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgage securities.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2009). MBSs come in many different structures. According to the SEC, the most basic types
are “pass-through participation certificates, which entitle the holder to a pro-rata share of all principal
and interest payments made on the pool of loan assets.” Id. More complicated MBSs are known as
collateralized mortgage obligations or mortgage derivatives. These more complicated versions may be
designed to protect investors from or expose investors to various types of risk. An important risk with
regard to residential mortgages involves prepayments, typically because homeowners refinance when
interest rates fall. Absent protection, such prepayments would return principal to investors precisely
when their options for reinvesting those funds may be relatively unattractive. Id.
46
Creation of a CDO is similar to that of a MBS. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS &
EXAMINATIONS, SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’ S
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 9 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf. A sponsor creates a trust to hold the CDO’s assets and
issue securities. Id. Usually a CDO is comprised of 200 or so debt securities in a pool. Id. This pool
may include MBSs along with many other types of debt securities. Id. Similar to a MBS, the trust then
collects interest and principal payments from the underlying debt securities pool and makes interest and
principal payments to investors in the CDO securities issued. Id. One significant difference between a
CDO and a MBS is that the trust may actively manage the CDO’s underlying assets, whereas the
mortgage loan pool underlying a MBS generally remains static. Id.
47
Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, CDO Boom Masks Subprime Losses, Abetted by S&P,
Moody’s, Fitch, BLOOMBERG, May 31, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=ajs7BqG4_X8I.
48
Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-57967, 93 SEC Docket 1266 (June 16, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/2008/34-57967.pdf.
49
Id.
50
Subordination, which is the most common, is the creation of a hierarchy of loss absorption
among a pool of tranche securities. Id. For example, if securities are issued in ten different tranches,
the first (or senior) tranche has nine subordinate tranches; the next highest tranche has eight subordinate
tranches and so on. See id. Any loss of interest and principal experienced by the pool of tranche
securities due to delinquencies and defaults in its underlying loans are allocated first to the lowest
tranche until it loses all of its principal amount (or a pre-arranged percentage thereof) and then to the
next lowest tranche and so on up the tranche levels. Id. Therefore, the senior tranche would be
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and bond insurance for CDOs. 53 The process of creating these “credit enhanced”
securities had almost no official oversight 54 and grew exponentially in
popularity. 55
MBS and CDO issuers further profited and complicated the process by
substituting credit default swaps (“CDS”) into CDOs instead of actual MBSs or
MBSs holding CDOs. 56 Many CDOs were owned by banks or insurance
companies. The regulators for those banks and insurance companies were
overwhelmed and relied on the NRSOs to police CDOs. 57 Kevin Fry, chairman of
the Invested Asset Working Group of the U.S. National Association of Insurance
Commissioners stated: “[a]s regulators, we just have to trust that rating agencies
are going to monitor CDOs and find the subprime . . . . We can’t get there. We
don’t have the resources to get our arms around it.”58
With little regulation, the rating companies profited by advising issuers on
how to squeeze the most profit out of these securities by maximizing the ratings on
tranches. 59 Additionally, after these securities had been created, investment banks
relied on the credit agencies to rate these securities favorably so various investment
groups, such as hedge funds, pension funds, and even other investment banks,
would invest in these “safe” securities. 60 These institutions often relied on ratings
so heavily that due diligence was overlooked or thought unnecessary. 61 This large
scheme of close relationships began to fall apart when mortgage delinquencies and
defaults skyrocketed 62 and the value of these securities plummeted. 63 It became
considered very “safe” as it would not incur any losses until all the lower tranches have first absorbed
losses from the underlying loans. Id.
51
Over-collateralization refers to an amount of principal balance in a mortgage pool, which
exceeds the principal balance of the tranche securities issued by the trust. Id. This excess principal
creates an additional “equity” tranche, or “cushion” of equity, below the lowest tranche security to
absorb losses. Id.
52
Excess spread refers to the amount by which the total interest received on underlying loans
exceeds the total interest payments due to investors in the tranche securities (plus administrative
expenses, which include loan servicing fees, premiums due on derivatives contracts, and bond
insurance). Id. “This excess spread can be used to build up loss reserves or pay off delinquent interest
payments due to a tranche security.” Id.
53
In addition to subordination, over-collateralization, and excess spread, CDOs often use bond
insurance as a method of credit enhancement. See id.
54
Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
55
Morgenson, supra note 41. One NRSRO claimed the average percentage of subprime MBSs in
the collateral pools of CDOs it rated grew from 43.3% in 2003 to 71.3% in 2006. OFFICE OF
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 11.
56
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 11. This way, the
issuer did not have to actually purchase subprime MBSs or other CDOs and instead would enter into
credit default swaps referencing subprime MBSs or CDOs or indexes on MBSs. See id. at 12. Some of
these CDOs were composed entirely of credit default swaps (“synthetic CDOs”); others were composed
of a combination of credit default swaps and actual MBSs (“hybrid CDOs”). See id.
57
Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
58
See id.
59
Id. This created a conflict of interest. See infra Part III.B.2.
60
See Voros, supra note 44. This also created a conflict of interest. See infra Part III.B.1
61
See Testimony of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, (2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/release/2008-63b.pdf.
62
See Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
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clear to everyone that these “safe” securities had been severely overrated by the
rating agencies. 64 Moody’s, S.&P., and Fitch then proceeded to quickly
downgrade ratings on thousands of securities, wiping out billions of dollars of
investors value. 65
B. Conflicts of Interest
1. Conflict of Interest: Issuer Pays Model
Ratings were originally conducted on a subscription based method. 66
However, in the 1970s, the rise of the copy machine led to the issuer pays model. 67
Former officials of Moody’s and S.&P. testified before Congress that the credit
rating agencies’ disastrous performance in the last decade can be attributed to
conflicts of interest, which primarily includes their current issuer pays business
model. 68 They allege this model, where securities issuers pay credit rating
agencies to rate the issuers’ products, 69 is inherently flawed. Frank L. Raiter, who
was previously the head of mortgage ratings at S.&P. for ten years, summarized
the company’s failures by simply saying: “[p]rofits were running the show.” 70
Jerome S. Fons, who was the managing director for credit policy at Moody’s until
2007, testified that under the issuer pays model, the rating agencies’ interests can
eclipse those of investors. 71
Not only is there the general problem with this model in that issuers have
great amounts of leverage over the rating agencies, but a further weakness is that it
undercuts incentives to monitor and downgrade securities in the post-issuance

63
Stephen Gandel, For Geithner’s “Bad Bank”: A Toxic Financial Mutant, TIME.COM, Feb. 9,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1878295,00.html. Not only did the value of
these and other similar securities drop, but they became almost worthless as parties tried unsuccessfully
to determine a value for them. See id.
64
Morgenson, supra note 41. Over the course of 2007 alone, Moody’s issued 1,655 discrete
downgrade actions (including multiple rating actions on the same tranche) on CDOs. Proposed Rules
for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 48, at 24. This constituted
roughly ten times the number of downgrade actions in 2006 and twice as many as in 2002 (previously
the most volatile year for CDOs). Id. The magnitude of these CDO downgrades (number of notches)
was noticeably sizeable at roughly seven notches. Id. Prior to 2007, average downgrades moved three
to four notches. Id. In the words of a March 2008 report by Moody’s, “The scope and degree of CDO
downgrades in 2007 was unprecedented.” Id. As of April 1, 2008, S.&P. had downgraded 3,068
tranches from 705 CDO transactions. Id. This totaled $321.9 billion in issuance. Id. S.&P. had also
placed 443 ratings from 119 transactions on CreditWatch negative. Id. By mid-December 2007, Fitch
had issued downgrades to 158 of the 431 CDOs it had rated with exposure to RMBS. Id. Among the
thirty CDOs with exposure to the subprime RMBS which “suffered the greatest extent and magnitude of
negative rating migration,” all but $82.7 million of the $20.7 billion in balance was downgraded. Id.
65
Morgenson, supra note 41.
66
Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1679 n.416 (2008).
67
Id.
68
Morgenson, supra note 41.
69
Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 48, at 26.
70
Morgenson, supra note 41.
71
Id.
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market. 72 This is because the continuing “surveillance” of the security is paid for
in advance from each issuer. 73 Few issuers are eager for their securities to be
monitored closely, especially if it could result in downgrades. 74 So ratings are
seldom downgraded until long after public information has signaled an obvious
deterioration in an issuer’s probability of default. 75
2. Conflict of Interest: Active Role in Creation of Securities
The process of rating securitized products is very different from the process
of rating traditional debt. 76 In the case of traditional debt, an issuer is unable to
adjust creditworthiness before issuance. 77 Therefore, pre-rating dialogue between
the rating agency and the issuer is of limited significance.78 However, in the case
of securitized products, extensive pre-rating dialogue takes place. 79 This process
begins with an issuer telling the rating agency a desired rating, and the rating
agency indicating whether the structure and level of credit support proposed by the
issuer will suffice to achieve that rating. 80 The increased complexity and
introduction of MBSs and CDOs led to the precarious position of the agencies not
merely creating neutral ratings on other parties’ instruments, but instead becoming
creators of the instruments themselves. This created a unique conflict of interest,
as the agencies had previously merely assigned ratings to debt and companies in
which they had no active role. 81 With these new structured finance vehicles “the
agencies [were] effectively involved in structuring these transactions,” according
to Karl Bergqwist, a senior manager at Gartmore Investment Management Plc in
London. 82 This is something the agencies vehemently deny. 83
IV. RESPONSE TO THE AGENCIES’ ACTIONS
In response to the rating agencies’ actions, there have been numerous
proposals for reform of the rating methods by industry groups, policymakers and

72
Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Dec. 10,
2008, available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2112.
73
Id. “Surveillance” refers to the process of an agency monitoring it own ratings on an ongoing
basis in order to ensure accuracy, and so it may enact rating changes as necessary. OFFICE OF
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 21. The agencies charge issuers,
upfront or annual fees, for surveillance. Proper surveillance is important, especially where issuers do
not publicly make available their due diligence information or underlying loan performance
information. Id.
74
Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, supra note 72.
75
Id.
76
Kettering, supra note 66, at 1681.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1681-82.
81
Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
82
Id.
83
Id. It seems as though this active role at least raises a strong possibility for closer than armslength rating transactions to occur.
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even the agencies themselves. 84 Organizations that have issued propositions
and/or requested comments relating to the role of ratings and agencies include the
SEC, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Financial Stability Forum,
and the agencies themselves. 85
A. The Agencies’ Own Response
The agencies’ response to the idea that they held the role of de facto
regulator in a securities market that had no official watchdog was that policing
these securities is not their job. 86 The companies point out that they only offer
their educated opinions. 87 Noel Kirnon, senior managing director at Moody’s said
“[w]hat we’re saying is that many people have the tendency to rely on [our
ratings], and we want to make sure that they don’t.” 88 Moody’s, S.&P., and Fitch
all presently assert investors should not base any investment decision on their
analyses, as they are merely opinions. 89
The three current executives of Moody’s, S.&P., and Fitch also deny that
conflicts of interest impaired their companies’ judgment on mortgage securities. 90
They all claim their methods of rating were not flawed. 91 However, all of the
companies are engaged in some form of implementation of initiatives which they
claim are designed to address conflicts of interest or strengthen rating methods. 92
B. The Government’s Response: SEC Findings
Since the origination of the “NRSRO” designation in 1975, 93 the procedure
to become an NRSRO was tightly held by the SEC. 94 Not only did the SEC
choose who they wanted designated as an NRSRO, there were no statutes or
regulations establishing substantive or procedural requirements for becoming an

84

Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 48.
Id.
86
Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. The idea that investors shouldn’t rely on these ratings seems preposterous. If ratings are
only opinions, as the agencies claim, then they should be nearly worthless as they would leave investors
“with very little new information.” Id. However, the reality is these ratings are not only highly coveted
by investors, but are often required to be considered by government mandate. See supra note 38. It
seems ridiculous that the agencies charge hefty fees to digest information and issue ratings that
investors must look at, all the while saying “we hope these ratings are not relied upon.” Surprisingly,
this “opinion” designation has successfully formed the basis as one of the agencies’ claimed legal
defenses. See infra note 198; Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689.
90
Morgenson, supra note 41.
91
Id.
92
See id. Interestingly, S.&P. has taken twenty-seven initiatives to “enhance the integrity of [its]
ratings process.” Id. For example, S.&P. now rotates analysts in their assignments and has established
an ombudsman office, “to protect against conflicts.” Id. Moody’s has also changed its practices “to
strengthen its standards.” Id. These actions seem to strongly infer an admission of wrongdoing.
93
Hill, supra note 28, at 54.
94
Id.
85
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NRSRO. 95 A principal of the Egan-Jones rating agency once said an SEC official
told him, “We won’t tell you the criteria [for obtaining NRSRO designation],
otherwise you might qualify.” 96
On September 29, 2006, 97 the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (the “Act”)
was signed into law. 98 The Act sought to modify the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and create greater oversight of the rating agencies by creating a new section,
section 15E. 99 Section 15E provided much needed SEC registration requirements
for NRSROs; 100 it also provided authority for the SEC to implement financial
reporting and oversight rules with respect to registered NRSROs. 101 Additionally,
the Act amended section 17(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to provide that
the SEC require reporting and recordkeeping requirements for registered
NRSROs. 102 The Act also established procedures to manage the handling of
material non-public information. 103 It also required disclosure and management of
conflicts of interest, and it prohibited a NRSRO from having certain conflicts of
interest and engaging in certain unfair, abusive, or coercive practices. 104
The agencies objected to the Act, arguing that the legislation represented an
unconstitutional infringement of the company’s free speech. 105
Ultimately though, while the Act did require disclosure to the SEC of a
general description of each agency’s procedures and methodologies for
determining credit ratings, and granted the SEC broad authority to examine all
books and records of the agencies, it did not allow the SEC to regulate “the
substance of the credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies” by which any
NRSRO determines credit ratings. 106 In fact, the Act expressly prohibited this.
This effectively left the act toothless, other than giving the SEC the ability to
expose the agencies’ practices to the light of day.

95

Id.
Id. at 54-55. Although the NRSO designation may not seem like much, because of government
regulation, this designation was and still is very valuable.
97
While the Act was introduced on September 29, 2006, the SEC’s related rules were not adopted
until June 18, 2007, and they became effective on June 26, 2007. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS
& EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 4.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. Until this, “NRSRO” had remained undefined. There was no formal procedure for
qualifying as a NRSRO, and the SEC had tightly controlled who was given the designation. See Hill,
supra note 28, at 54 and accompanying text.
101
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 4.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Marie Leone, Bush Signs Rating Agency Reform Act, CFO, Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/7991492/c_7989907?f=TodayInFinance_Inside. This seems like a poor argument in light of
the use of ratings being mandated by government to be considered. This goes back to the agencies’
constant assertion that ratings are merely “opinions.” While this argument has held up historically, it
would seem time to move forward and admit these ratings are significant tools used in financial
analysis, and are sold as such. Additionally, it would seem the government should have some authority
to set standards for quality of the ratings since the government is going to mandate reliance on the
quality of the ratings.
106
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 4.
96
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While the changes under the Act were welcome, more was needed. On June
16, 2008, in response to the recent economic catastrophe that the rating agencies
had contributed to, the SEC published a new “Proposed Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” (“Proposed Rules “). 107
On December 1, 2008, The Financial Economists Roundtable, a group

107

Id. These Proposed Rules sought to:
Enhance the disclosure and comparability of credit ratings performance statistics;
Increase the disclosure of information about structured finance products;
Require more information about the procedures and methodologies used to
determine credit ratings for structured finance products;
Strengthen internal control processes through reporting requirements; and
Address conflicts of interest arising from the process of rating structured finance
products; and
Reduce undue reliance in the Commission’s rules on NRSRO ratings, thereby
promoting increased investor due diligence.
Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 48, at 7. These
Proposed Rules included prohibiting an NRSRO from issuing a rating on a structured product unless
information on the characteristics of assets underlying the product is available. OFFICE OF
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 4. This allows other credit rating
agencies to use the information to rate the same product and, potentially, expose ratings unduly
influenced by the product’s sponsors. Id. Additionally, the Proposed Rules sought to:
Prohibit an NRSRO from issuing a rating where the NRSRO or a person
associated with the NRSRO has made recommendations as to structuring the
same products that it rates.
Require NRSROs to make all of their ratings and subs- equent rating actions
publicly available, to facilitate comparisons of NRSROs by making it easier to
analyze the performance of the credit ratings the NRSROs issue in terms of
assessing creditworthiness.
Prohibit anyone who participates in determining a credit rating from negotiating
the fee that the issuer pays for it, to prevent business considerations from
undermining the NRSRO’s objectivity.
Prohibit gifts from those who receive ratings to those who rate them, in any
amount over $25.
Require NRSROs to publish performance statistics for one, three and ten years
within each rating category, in a way that facilitates comparison with their
competitors in the industry.
Require disclosure by the NRSROs of whether and how information about
verification performed on the assets underlying a structured product is relied on
in determining credit ratings.
Require disclosure of how frequently credit ratings are reviewed; whether
different models are used for ratings surveillance than for initial ratings; and
whether changes made to models are applied retroactively to existing ratings.
Require NRSROs to make an annual report of the number of ratings actions they
took in each ratings class.
Require documentation of the rationale for any material difference between the
rating implied by a qualitative model that is a “substantial component” in the
process of determining a credit rating and the final rating issued.
Require NRSROs to differentiate the ratings they issue on structured products
from other securities, either through issuing a report disclosing how procedures
and methodologies and credit risk characteristics for structured finance products
differ from other securities, or using different symbols, such as attaching an
identifier to the rating.
Id. at 4-5.
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composed of senior financial economists, 108 issued a statement of strong support
for the SEC’s Proposed Rules. 109 Some of the SEC’s Proposed Rules were
adopted by the SEC on December 3, 2008. 110 However, the SEC’s adopted
version of these rules turned out to be largely toothless compared to the June
Proposed Rules. 111
In addition to the SEC’s June 2008 Proposed Rules, in July 2008, the SEC
issued its Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s
Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies. 112 This report was the
culmination of an almost yearlong thorough examination conducted by the SEC. 113
Although the firms under examination became subject to regulation as
NRSROs when they registered with the Commission as NRSROs in September
2007, and were therefore not subject to legal obligations applicable to NRSROs
during most of the review period, “the [SEC] nonetheless sought to make relevant

108
The Financial Economists Roundtable is a “15-year-old group of top economists from around
the world that meets every year to tackle economic issues.” Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules
Have Any Bite?, supra note 72.
109
Financial Economists Roundtable, Statement on Reforming the Role of the Statistical Ratings
Organizations in the Securitization Process (Dec. 1, 2008), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy
%20page/FER12%201%2008rev.pdf.
110
SEC adopts new rules for credit-rating agencies, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 3, 2008, available
at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/03/business/NA-US-SEC-Rating-Agencies.php. While these
rules were adopted December 3, 2008, they were published February 2, 2009, and they were made
effective April 10, 2009. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342 (Feb. 2, 2009) http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
2009/34-59342.pdf.
111
Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, supra note 72. These new rules do
ban agencies from rating securities they helped create, bar raters from accepting gifts worth more than
$25 from clients, mandate disclosure of statistics on upgrades and downgrades, and require description
of information verification steps taken. However, these rules do not adopt the proposed extra
requirements on ratings for complex securities. Id. Additionally, the rules that proposed reduced use of
ratings in SEC regulations were not adopted. Id. This ends up being the SEC adopting the equivalent
of a “quarter of a loaf” as described by one Wharton finance professor. Id. Another Wharton finance
professor noted the original June proposal as being “very bold,” but the new rules are “very limited.”
Id. This seems to follow a trend of the government doing very little to really interfere in the agencies’
actions. Ironically, one of the major rules adopted by the SEC, the new ban on agencies from rating
securities they helped create, is commendable in theory, but may be ultimately unenforceable. Id.
Because there is so much back and forth in the normal rating process it may be “impossible for the
courts to distinguish ratings services from advisory services in a definitive way.” Id. at 3. Additionally,
the June proposal for reduced use of ratings in SEC regulations, could have been the most valuable as it
would have limited the government mandated use of agencies, forced investors to do more research on
their own, and ultimately decreased the massive amounts of power the agencies hold. Id. It seems
unfortunate that the SEC did not adopt this proposal.
112
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46.
113
This examination began on August 31, 2007, and review period generally covered January 2004
through July 2008. Id. It was conducted by the Staff in the Commission’s Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”), Division of Trading and Markets (“Trading & Markets”) and
Office of Economic Analysis (“OEA Staff”). Id. at 3. It included examinations of Fitch, Moody’s and
S&P with respect to their activities in rating subprime MBSs and CDOs. Id. According to the SEC:
The examinations included extensive on-site interviews with the rating agencies’
staff, including senior and mid-level managers, initial ratings analysts and
surveillance analysts, internal compliance personnel and auditors, personnel
responsible for building, maintaining and upgrading the ratings models and
methodologies used in the ratings process and other relevant rating agency staff.
Id.

146

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. III:I

factual findings and observations with respect to the activities of these firms in
rating subprime RMBS and CDOs during the period, as well as to identify possible
areas for improvement in their practices going forward.” 114 This examination led
the SEC to conclude that there were failures by the agencies in seven key areas: (1)
the rating agencies dealing with market growth; (2) ratings process disclosure; (3)
ratings policies and procedure documentation; (4) implementation of new
practices; (5) documentation; (6) internal surveillance processes; and (7)
management of Conflicts of Interest. 115
1. The Rating Agencies Struggled to Keep up with the Increasing
Number and complexity of deals
The SEC found that from 2002 to 2006, the volume and complexity of
RMBS and CDO deals rated by the rating agencies increased exponentially. 116
While the agencies increased staffing percentage-wise to match the increase in
MBS deal volume, their staffing appeared to lag with regard to the increase in
CDO deal volume. 117 Additionally, the agencies appeared to struggle to adapt to
the increased complexity of the instruments the agencies were asked to rate. 118
However, even with this struggle, the agencies pushed for continued ratings in a
business-as-usual manner. 119
The SEC recommended each NRSRO evaluate whether it has sufficient staff
and resources to manage its volume of business and meet its obligations under
section 15E of the Exchange Act and the rules applicable to NRSROs. 120

114

Id.
Id.
116
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 10-13.
117
Id. It could be that the agencies did not want to increase staffing costs. This however, seems to
not address the agencies’ desire to handle as much business as possible and be as profitable as possible.
118
This increased complexity arose from expanded use of credit default swaps as well as RMBSs,
became more complex and less conservative. Id. It also may be that due to the increased complexity of
these products it was difficult to find qualified individuals to fill the positions needed. The agencies
probably also just had no idea how large, and how fast the market for these complex securities would
explode, and couldn’t find people to keep up with the complexity and the workload. It sounds like there
was a great deal of burnout. The SEC report does not address this, but the employees of the agencies
were not compensated nearly as much as the employees for the issuers and other parties to the
securitization process. With their experience, there was probably great incentive to leave the agencies
for higher paying positions elsewhere.
119
In one now famous email exchange, an analyst expressed concern that her firm’s model did not
capture “half” of the deal’s risk, but that “it could be structured by cows and we would rate it.” Id. at
12.
120
Id. This evaluation was to be conducted both at the time of the recommendation and on a
continuing periodic basis. Id. at 10-13. While this sounds good, it seems that telling the agencies that
they need to evaluate their workforce is no real answer. It would seem logical that they are already
aware of their staffing levels, particularly given the internal emails addressing this problem which are
referenced in the SEC report.
115
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2. The Agencies Failed to Disclose Significant Aspects of the Rating
Process
While the rating agencies stated to the SEC that they had always disclosed
their MBS and CDO ratings process, certain significant aspects of their ratings
processes and methodologies were not always disclosed, or were not fully
disclosed. 121
Prior to being registered as NRSROs, the rating agencies did not have a
regulatory requirement to disclose their methodologies. In September 2007, three
major agencies became subject to these rules. They are required to submit detailed
descriptions of the procedures and methodologies they use. 122 The Exchange Act
and rules applicable to NRSROs specifically delineate the importance of
disclosure. 123
The SEC stated that each NRSRO must conduct a review of its current
disclosures relating to processes and methodologies for rating RMBS and CDOs to
assess whether it fully discloses its ratings methodologies in compliance with
section 15E of the Exchange Act and the rules applicable to NRSROs. 124 Further,
the SEC recommended that each NRSRO be examined to review whether its
policies governing the timing of disclosure of a significant change to a process or
methodology are reasonably designed to comply with these requirements. 125 Each
examined NRSRO stated that it will implement the staff’s recommendations. 126
The SEC noted that under its Proposed Rules it sought to require enhanced
disclosure about the procedures and methodologies that NRSROs use to determine
credit ratings. 127 The Proposed Rules also seek to add additional areas that an
121
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE I NSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 13. This lack of
disclosure included use of unpublished ratings criteria, failure to disclose materials used in the ratings
process, disclosure of a criteria report that was obsolete, use of an obsolete model, lag time between
announcement of implementation of ratings procedure, regularly making of “out of model adjustments”
without rationale documentation, reducing subprime loss expectations from model projections, and not
adjusting collateral or cash flow analysis based upon factors no included in the firms models. Id.
122
Id. at 15. Since the government mandates reliance on these ratings, it seems the government
should know how these ratings are being calculated.
123
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 15.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 15. Additional proposals included requiring the NRSROs to provide descriptions of:
[P]olicies for determining whether to initiate a credit rating; a description of the
public and non-public sources of information used in determining credit ratings,
including information and analysis provided by third-party vendors; the
quantitative and qualitative models and metrics used to determine credit ratings;
the methodologies by which credit ratings of other credit rating agencies are
treated to determine credit ratings for securities or money market instruments
issued by an asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgaged-backed
securities transaction; the procedures for interacting with the management of a
rated obligor or issuer of rated securities or money market instruments; the
structure and voting process of committees that review or approve credit ratings;
procedures for informing rated obligors or issuers of rated securities or money
market instruments about credit rating decisions and for appeals of final or
pending credit rating decisions; procedures for monitoring, reviewing, and
updating credit ratings; and procedures to withdraw, or suspend the maintenance
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applicant and a registered NRSRO would be required to address in its description
of its procedures and methodologies in its registration form (“Form NRSRO”). 128
3. The Agencies Lacked Written Policies & Procedures for Complex
Securities
The rating agencies have always had in-house policies which emphasized
integrity-driven accurate ratings. 129 When the agencies registered as NRSROs in
September 2007, they became required to make and retain specific internal
documents. 130 The SEC noted that while the agencies had improved their policies
and procedures during the examination period, none of the rating agencies
examined had specific written procedures for all significant aspects of the process
of rating RMBSs and CDOs. 131 Additionally, the SEC noted that it did not appear
that the agencies had specific policies and procedures to identify or address errors
in their models or methodologies. 132
The SEC recommended that each NRSRO conduct an internal review and be
sure that its written MBS and CDO ratings policies and procedures are fully
documented in accordance with the requirements of Rule 17g-2. 133

of a credit rating.
Id. at 15 n.18. These proposals were adopted by the SEC. Amendments to Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 110, at 12.
128
These NRSRO registration form changes include:
How frequently credit ratings are reviewed, whether different models or criteria
are used for ratings surveillance than for determining initial ratings, whether
changes made to models and criteria for determining initial ratings are applied
retroactively to existing ratings and whether changes made to models and criteria
for performing ratings surveillance are incorporated into the models and criteria
for determining initial ratings;
Whether and, if so, how information about verification performed on assets
underlying or referenced by a security or money market instrument issued by an
asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities
transaction is relied on in determining credit ratings; and
Whether and, if so, how assessments of the quality of originators of assets
underlying or referenced by a security or money market instrument issued by an
asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities
transaction play a part in the determination of credit ratings.
Id. at 16.
129
Id. While these policies were in place, it is not clear to what extent they were actually
observed. Clearly, at least to some degree, the SEC investigation shows a propensity for the agencies to
engage in less than transparent procedures.
130
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 16. Some of these
requirements include: records pertaining to accounting, employee identities, customers, subscribers,
products offered, procedures and methodologies, securities rated, internal affairs, credit analysis,
compliance, internal audits, marketing materials, and communications. Records to be made and
retained by NRSROs, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2009).
131
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 16. The SEC noted
that this lack of documentation made it difficult for SEC Staff to confirm that the individual ratings
complied with policies and procedures. It also noted that this lack of documentation could also impede
the effectiveness of internal and external auditors conducting reviews of rating agency activities. Id.
132
Id. at 16-17.
133
Id. at 17. Each examined agency stated that it will conduct this review. Id.
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4. The Agencies Lacked Issuer Due Diligence Requirements
Presently there are no requirements that the rating agencies verify
information in MBS loan portfolios. 134 Additionally, there are no requirements
that the agencies request performance of due diligence on any of the information
they receive. 135 Nor are they required to obtain information about the level of due
diligence that has or has not been performed by the issuers supplying them with
information.136 In fact, each rating agency publicly disclosed that it did not engage
in any due diligence or otherwise seek to verify the accuracy or quality of the loan
data underlying their ratings. 137 While all of the rating agencies examined have
implemented, or announced that they would implement, measures that are designed
to improve the integrity and accuracy of the loan data they receive on underlying
RMBS pools, 138 as of the time of this writing, all three agencies’ websites
continues to contain extensive language disclaiming they do not engage or require
any sort of due diligence. 139
134

OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 17.
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 17-18. This again proves the agencies’ attempts to disclaim any and all responsibility for
their ratings. While this probably should not even be acceptable for transactions where they were truly
brought in at arms-length, it becomes especially dubious in situations where they were involved in the
actual process of creating of securities.
138
Id. at 18. In January 2008, one agency began conducting more extensive reviews of mortgage
originations and their practices, including a review of originator/conduit/issuer due diligence reports
and a sample of mortgage origination files for all subprime transactions. Id. This same agency had
conducted an internal review of forty-five loan files and reported that it had found the appearance of
fraud or misrepresentation in almost every file. Id. Another agency announced that after May 1, 2008,
it was requesting updated loan level performance data from issuers on a monthly basis. Id. It also
intended to incorporate the quality of an originator’s fraud tools and detection policies into its ratings
criteria by mid-year 2008. Id. Additionally, all three of the major rating agencies agreed to develop
and publicly disclose due diligence criteria to be performed by underwriters on all mortgages
comprising MBSs, and to review those results prior to issuing ratings. Id.
139
Moody’s code of conduct on its website currently includes:
[Moody’s] has no obligation to perform, and does not perform, due diligence
with respect to the accuracy of information it receives or obtains in connection
with the rating process. [Moody’s] does not independently verify any such
information. Nor does [Moody’s] audit or otherwise undertake to determine that
such information is complete. Thus, in assigning a Credit Rating, [Moody’s] is in
no way providing a guarantee or any kind of assurance with regard to the
accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of factual information reflected, or
contained, in the Credit Rating or any related [Moody’s] publication.
Moody’s, Code of Professional Conduct, Nov. 6, 2008, http://v2.moodys.com/cust/content/Content.
ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%20Pages/Regulatory%20Affairs/Documents/professional_conduct.pd
f. S.&P.’s code of conduct on its website currently includes:
[S.&P.] is not obligated to perform any due diligence or independent verification
of any information submitted to, or obtained by, [S.&P.] in connection with its
rating and surveillance processes. [S.&P.] does not perform an audit and does
not undertake to verify that the information submitted to, or obtained by, [S.&P.]
is complete. Ratings are not verifiable statements of fact. The assignment of a
rating to an issuer or an issue by [S.&P.] should not be viewed as a guarantee of
the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information relied on in
connection with the rating or the results obtained from the use of such
information. [S.&P.] reserves the right at any time to suspend, modify, lower,
raise, or withdraw a rating or place a rating on CreditWatch in accordance with
135
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The SEC’s Proposed Rules include two additional due diligence
requirements which include:
Whether and, if so, how information about verification performed on assets
underlying or referenced by a security or money market instrument issued by an
asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities transaction
is relied on in determining credit ratings; and
Whether and, if so, how assessments of the quality of originators of assets
underlying or referenced by a security or money market instrument issued by an
asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities transaction
play a part in the determination of credit ratings. 140

5. The Agencies Failed to Document Major Steps in the Rating
Process
After September 2007, the agencies became required to retain their internal
records, including any non-public information and work-product, used to form the
basis of their ratings. 141 Prior to September 2007, the agencies had established
policies and procedures generally requiring documentation of their ratings
committee processes and key deliberations. 142 However, the agencies did not
always fully document certain significant steps in their subprime MBS and CDO
ratings processes. 143 This made it difficult or impossible for the SEC to assess
its policies, guidelines and procedures.
Standard & Poor’s, Ratings Services Code of Conduct, Dec. 2008, at 3, http://www2.standardandpoors
.com/spf/csv/equity/Code_of_Conduct_December%202008.pdf?vregion=us&vlang=en. Fitch’s code
of conduct currently includes:
Ratings are based on information obtained directly from issuers, other obligors,
underwriters, their experts and other sources Fitch believes to be reliable. Fitch
does not audit or verify the truth or accuracy of such information and has
undertaken no obligation to so audit or verify such information or to perform any
other kind of investigative diligence into the accuracy or completeness of such
information.
If any such information should turn out to contain
misrepresentations or to be otherwise misleading, the rating associated with that
information may not be appropriate and Fitch assumes no responsibility for this
risk. The assignment of a rating to any issuer or any security should not be
viewed as a guarantee of the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of the
information relied on in connection with the rating or the results obtained from
the use of such information.
Fitch Ratings, Code of Conduct, Jan. 2009, at 16-17, http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/credit_
policy/code_of_conduct.pdf.
140
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 19.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. Specifically the SEC noted lax documentation for: reasoning for deviating from models,
rating committee actions and decisions, and identification of major process participants. Id. Rationale
for deviations from the model or out of model adjustments was not always documented, this led to the
SEC being unable to understand the process leading to a rating and identifying the factors that led to the
ultimate rating. Id. Lack of documentation on committee actions and decisions included: rating
committee vote tallies being rarely documented despite being a required item; numerous deal files
failing to include required addenda and/or included no documentation of the ratings surveillance
process; failures to make or retain committee memos and/or minutes; and failures to include certain
relevant information in committee reports. Id. Lack of documentation on internal procedures and
analysts and/or ratings committee participants approving ratings included: lack of documentation of
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compliance and identify factors considered when developing ratings. 144 This lack
of documentation also made it difficult for the rating agencies’ internal staff to
review activities and assess compliance with the firms’ policies. 145
Since September 2007, NRSROs are required to make and retain certain
records relating to their businesses and to retain certain other business records
made in the normal course of business operations which include identities of any
credit analyst(s) participating in determining a rating; the identity of the person(s)
approving the rating before issuance; an indication of whether the rating was
solicited or unsolicited; and the date of the rating action. 146
The SEC again recommended that each examined NRSRO conduct a review
of its documentation policies and practices to ensure compliance with Rule 17g2. 147 Each NRSRO stated that it would implement the staff’s recommendations. 148
In the SEC’s Proposed Rules there was an amendment that would require
that if a quantitative model was a substantial component of a ratings process, the
rating agency would be required to keep a record of the rationale for any material
difference between the credit rating implied by the model and the final credit rating
issued. 149
6. The Agencies Engaged in Low Quality Surveillance
Rating agencies are not required to perform surveillance, 150 but they often
have done so in order to change the ratings when circumstances indicate that a
change is required. 151 The SEC found that resources devoted to surveillance were
limited, making surveillance and any accompanying surveillance documentation
limited. 152 This occurred while the agencies claimed they carried out surveillance.
committee attendees even though internal procedures called for it. Id. at 20.
144
Id. at 19.
145
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 19.
146
Id. at 20.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. The SEC adopted this proposed rule. Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized
Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 110, at 98-99.
150
Id. at 21.
151
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 21.
152
Id. Specifically, the SEC found the surveillance process to be of an even lower quality than that
of the initial ratings process. Id. A large reason for this seems to be due to a lack of resources. Id.
Internal emails demonstrate the lack of employees; in one email addressing surveillance, a manager
wrote:
I have been thinking about this for much of the night. We do not have the
resources to support what we are doing now. I am seeing evidence that I really
need to add to the staff to keep up with what is going on with sub prime and
mortgage performance in general, NOW.
Id. at 21 n.29 (internal quotation marks omitted). This caused surveillance to be untimely at best. Id. at
21. At worst, the lack of follow up was ridiculous. Scott McCleskey, head of compliance at Moody’s
from April 2006 to September 2008 testified that some ratings were not reviewed, sometimes for
decades. Gretchen Morgenson, When Bond Ratings Get Stale, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at BU1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/business/economy/11gret.html. The agencies often
lacked procedures and policies to perform surveillance. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE I NSPECTIONS &
EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 22. When there were procedures and policies in place, the
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Therefore, changes that should have been made to a security’s rating often did not
happen.
The SEC noted under the Exchange Act that the NRSROs are required to
publicly disclose their procedures and methodologies used to determine ratings.153
The SEC recommended that the NRSROs review their resources devoted to
surveillance of existing MBS and CDO ratings to determine adequacy. 154
Additionally, the SEC recommended the NRSROs ensure that they have
comprehensive written surveillance procedures, and that they maintain appropriate
surveillance records. 155
Under the SEC’s Proposed Rules, the SEC proposed enhanced disclosure of
procedures and methodologies that the NRSROs would use to determine credit
ratings, which would include disclosing how frequently credit ratings are reviewed,
whether surveillance models and criteria equal their initial rating model
counterparts, whether changes to initial rating models and criteria are applied
retroactively to surveilled ratings, and whether changes made to surveillance
models and criteria are incorporated into initial ratings models and criteria.156
7. The Agencies Failed to Properly Manage Conflicts of Interest
a. The “Issuer Pays” Conflict
Similar to the allegations by the agencies’ own former executives, 157 the
SEC found that the “issuer pays” model involves an inherent conflict of interest.158
SEC policies require NRSROs to “establish, maintain and enforce policies and
procedures reasonably designed to address and manage conflicts of interest.” 159
The NRSROs have their own policies emphasizing their ratings’ accuracy and
integrity. 160 These policies include restricting analysts from participating in fee

agencies often failed to follow them. Id. Often surveillance did not occur, or if it did, the company
could not process its own surveillance. Id. One internal email stated, “[i]f I were the S.E.C. I would
ask why can [sic] you go back and run the report for each of the months using the same assumptions?
In theory we should be able to do this.” Id. at 22 n.31 (internal quotation marks omitted). So it does
not seem as though the agencies did not know this was going on. It appears that they were overworked,
and the last thing they were addressing was re-rating securities they had already initially rated. It
would seem that this lack of surveillance would hurt the agencies’ reputations, but they did not seem to
care, as there was blatant lack of surveillance.
153
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 22. This
lack of surveillance may be addressed under the SEC’s power to censure, limit the activities, functions,
or operations of, suspend, or revoke the registration of an NRSRO that fails to maintain adequate
financial and managerial resources to produce credit ratings with integrity. Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 22-23. The SEC adopted this proposed rule. See also Amendments to Rules for
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 110, at 14.
157
See supra Part III.B.1.
158
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 23. SEC
rules specify that a conflict of interest exists if an NRSRO being paid by issuers or underwriters to rate
their securities. Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. Practically every major company has similar policies. This does not seem to mean much,
especially in light of the SEC finding numerous questionable actions in its investigation.
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discussions with issuers. 161 While these policies existed, the SEC found key
participants in the ratings process still participated in fee discussions.162
The SEC’s Proposed Rules included a proposal to amend existing rules to
disallow NRSRO employees from being involved in both fee discussions and
ratings decisions. 163 This amendment prohibits an NRSRO from having an
individual participate in any fee discussions or arrangements when that individual
has participated in developing, determining, or approving procedures or
methodologies used for determining credit ratings.164
“Analysts appeared to be aware, when rating an issuer, of the rating agency’s
business interest in securing the rating of the deal.” 165 The SEC staff noted
multiple communications indicating that some analysts were aware of the firm’s
fee schedules and actual fees. 166 There did not appear to be any shielding analysts
from emails and other communications that discussed fees. 167
b. The “Market Share and Business Interests” Conflict
While there was no evidence that ratings methodologies, models, or
decisions were based on attracting or losing market share, 168 the SEC did find
evidence that employees involved in the ratings process voiced concern about
market share to other employees involved in the ratings criteria developing
department. 169
Under current regulations, 170 in addition to NRSROs being required to
establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed to
take into consideration the nature of its business and address and manage conflicts
of interest, they are further prohibited from having certain conflicts unless they
disclose the type of conflict and implement policies and procedures to address and
manage it. 171

161
Id. at 23-24. The idea behind these policies is separation of the individuals who set and
negotiate fees from the individuals who actually engage in the rating process. This is in an effort to
mitigate the possibility or perception that an agency would link its ratings to its fees. Id. This does not
appear to in any way mitigate the financial relationship between the companies though, and in no way
did this seem to slow the rating agencies’ propensity to slap ratings on everything including “cows.”
See supra, note 119.
162
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 24.
Some of the agencies implemented policy changes in 2007 to address analytical personnel being
involved in fee discussions. Id.
163
Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note
110, at 43. This amendment was adopted by the SEC in April 2009. Id. at 43-44.
164
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 24.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 25. This included emails between analysts and management discussing fees, as well as
even analysts discussing fees with billing departments of issuing clients. Id.
168
Id. at 25.
169
Id.
170
See section 15E(h)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o7(h)(1) (2006)); Rule 17g-5 of the Securities Exchange Act (found at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(6)).
171
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 26
(“Included among these conflicts is being paid by issuers or underwriters to determine credit ratings
with respect to securities or money market instruments they issue or underwrite.”).
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Each NRSRO agreed to implement the SEC’s recommendations which
included reviewing “practices, policies and procedures” for mitigating and
managing this conflict of interest.” 172
The SEC noted its Proposed Rules called for necessitated disclosure on
assets underlying a security to issue or maintain a rating. 173 This allows other
parties to rate the security allowing for greater accountability by the NRSROs. 174
c. The Internal Audit Process Conflict
The SEC concluded that the rating agencies varied in their internal audit
programs and compliance with these programs. 175 Only one of the three appeared
adequate in terms of assessing compliance with internal control procedures. 176
According to Exchange Act Rule 17g-2(b)(5), NRSROs are required to
“maintain internal audit plans, reports and related follow-up documents, including
internal audit plans and reports, documents relating to audit follow-up measures
and documents identified by auditors as necessary to audit an activity relating to
the NRSRO’s business as a rating agency.” 177 Both of the NRSROs which did not
conduct acceptable audits agreed to the SEC’s request to review their internal audit
functions and subsequent management follow-up, particularly in the RMBS and
CDO ratings areas. 178
In summary, with respect to these previous seven areas, the SEC found that
from 2002 to 2006, the agencies struggled to keep up with the increasing number
and complexity of deals, failed to disclose significant aspects of the rating process,
lacked written policies & procedures for complex securities, lacked issuer due
diligence requirements, failed to document major steps in the ratings process,
engaged in low quality surveillance, failed to properly manage the “issuer pays”
conflict of interest, mishandled their focus on market share, and failed to maintain
quality internal audit processes. 179 Amazingly, with all of these shortcomings, the
SEC’s response was, basically, “do better.” 180 The SEC “recommended” changes,
many of which were required under the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.
However, the SEC still had no real power to regulate “the substance of the credit
ratings or the procedures and methodologies.” 181 This left the SEC as an observer,
172
Id. at 27 (“In particular, the [s]taff recommended that each NRSRO examined consider and
implement steps that would insulate or prevent the possibility that considerations of market share and
other business interests could influence ratings or ratings criteria.”).
173
Id. This proposed rule was adopted by the SEC. Amendments to Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 110, at 69.
174
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 27.
175
Id. at 29. The SEC examined the internal audit portion of their investigation for the time period
January 2003 to November 2007. Id.
176
Id. This sole agency conducted substantive audits of the securities MBSs & CDOs it rated, as
well as reviews of particular concerns. Id. at 30. Additionally, management responded adequately to
recommendations arising from the audits. Id. One of the other two agencies only performed cursory
MBS and CDO audits, while the other agency’s audits were full of shortcomings. Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 3.
180
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 10-20.
181
Id. at 4.
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who can and did expose harmful practices, but cannot do much more than that. It
is clear in the SEC’s report it was a weak observer, choosing to constantly
recommend strengthening practices and changing methods, but never clearly and
succinctly stating something was wrong, even when something clearly was.
V. LIABILITY EXPOSURE
Regulation has historically been kept away from the complex financial
product that the ratings agencies rate. 182 It has been only recently that regulators
became interested in the rating agencies. Such interest was sparked in 2001, when
the agencies failed to adjust ratings down from investment grade on the ordinary
debt of Enron Corporation until four days before Enron filed for bankruptcy. 183 A
subsequent tidal wave of legislative and administrative activity pertaining to the
agencies ensued. 184 Congress’ response included the previously discussed 2006
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which ultimately imposed a small measure of
regulatory oversight on the NRSROs, which, until then, were essentially
unregulated. 185 The previous lack of regulation has historically left the tort system
and the market to serve as checks on these agencies. 186
Securitized products in general lacked early litigation challenging their legal
underpinnings. 187 The ratings agencies not only lacked early legal challenges like
the securitization process in general, but subsequently the agencies have
successfully avoided liability when legal challenges have occurred.188 Much of

182

Moran, supra note 11.
Kettering, supra note 66, at 1674.
184
Id. at 1674-75. This included at least nine separate congressional hearings, a major
congressional staff report, and usual reports on the legislation as enacted and predecessor bills. Id. In
addition, the SEC held its own hearings, issued a congressionally-mandated report, and floated
proposals for changing the regulatory treatment of rating agencies before Congress took the subject into
its own hands. Id. It is interesting that this wave of political action occurred after the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 was passed. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). Effectively, the
government deregulated complex securitized instruments, and then turned around and voted for more
regulation of the ratings agencies, when the political fallout from Enron occurred. See Kettering, supra
note 66. It would seem these two courses could contradict, but the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000 actually allowed the SEC to inspect ratings agencies (more oversight); it also attempted to
open the door to free market competition in the rating industry by allowing new agencies to achieve
NRSRO designation. Leone, supra note 105.
185
See, e.g., Husisian, supra note 33.
186
Id.
187
See Kettering, supra note 66, at 1672. There are many theories as to why the securitization
process did not come under legal attack in its early years. Id. This failure to come under early attack
has led to securitization becoming “too big to fail.” Id. at 1672-74. The ratings agencies have been
thought to contribute to the “too big to fail” status of securities. Id. This is because they created
securitized products that will survive challenge in an originator’s bankruptcy by the originator
appropriately setting the ratio of assets in the pool to the amount of debt issued, so the resulting
instrument was rated at a high investment grade, superior to the originator’s own credit rating, allowing
the originator to obtain financing at the lower interest rates associated with the highly-rated debt it
would have been otherwise unable to obtain. Id.
188
See id. at 1687, 1691 (noting that NRSROs have been very successful in avoiding liability for
allegedly incorrect ratings).
183
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this success has arisen from active protections in security laws. 189
One commenter stated that in the relatively few cases in which anyone has
tried to pursue the rating agencies, “the only common element . . . is that the rating
agencies win.” 190 This success has often been based on commonplace defenses. 191
A. Common Defenses
Investors who wish to claim that dealing with a rating agency has
established, by contract, a greater standard of care by the agency, 192 will find the
agencies have not only not negotiated such contracts, but have explicitly
disclaimed liability. 193 The agencies hide behind the claim that they rely on
information provided to them by others, and therefore, they are not responsible for
any errors or omissions or for the results obtained from use of that information. 194
The argument that a bond rating agency is an investor’s fiduciary fails
because in the investment field fiduciary duties are implied only where there is a
more specialized relationship than that which exists between a rating agency and
its subscribers. 195 Additionally, courts would risk a potential chilling effect on
credit ratings if they imposed a negligent misrepresentation standard because there
is no fiduciary relationship or contractual relationship.196
The agencies have consistently claimed “they are financial publishers whose
ratings are equivalent to newspaper editorials.”197 They claim that a rating is an
“unfalsifiable opinion.” 198 Therefore, it is wholly protected, or in the alternative,

189
A 2002 congressional staff study noted that NRSROs are “officially shielded from liability for
all but fraud under the securities laws” and are “not held even to a negligence standard of care for their
work.” Id. at 1687.
190
Id. at 1688.
191
Id. (such as lack of duty to an aggrieved investor and the unreasonableness of an investor
relying on a rating).
192
Husisian, supra note 33, at 456.
193
Id.
194
See id. For current disclaimers by the agencies, see resources cited in note 138.
195
Husisian, supra note 33, at 457. In his article, Husisian notes:
As the parties’ relationship changes from one of private counseling to one of
public offerings of information, the client’s fiduciary interest declines, and the
publisher’s first amendment protections increase. Once the publication reaches
the level of general publishing, where the clients are known to the publisher only
as names on a mailing list, the publishers’ fiduciary duty diminishes to zero.
Thus, Standard & Poor’s has ample support for its contention that “[ratings] do
not create a fiduciary relationship between Standard & Poor’s and users of the
ratings since there is no legal basis for the existence of such a relationship.”
Id. at 458 (citing S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA 3 (Roy Weinberger ed. 1986).
196
Id. at 455.
197
Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689. Several courts have accepted this argument. See infra Part
V.A.
198
Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689. According to Husisian, the agencies contend that:
Ratings are editorial opinions, published in letter form. The purpose of any
editorial, whether or not it is in the financial arena, is to communicate
information to the reader. The form of the speech is irrelevant, as the Court has
recognized by granting first amendment protections to certain symbolic acts, such
as flag-burning. The first amendment is only concerned with whether ideas are

2009

RATING AGENCIES

157

they claim that it is about a matter of public interest and is protected by the “actual
malice” standard laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 199 Some courts
have accepted this argument. 200 Even Congress took the First Amendment
argument seriously when it deliberated about the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act. 201
This First Amendment defense will have to be litigated further. While “the
First Amendment has been held by the Supreme Court to protect the editorial
content of [financial] newspapers and newsletters,” 202 ratings may be distinguished
from these. It will remain to be seen whether those distinctions will be
constitutionally significant. 203
B. Has the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act Changed Anything?
Instead of the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act opening the door to
liability against the ratings agencies, it may have pushed the door even further
closed. 204 The Act forecloses the argument that a rating agency’s election to
register as an NRSRO can be viewed as a waiver of any First Amendment
protection that might otherwise apply. 205 Additionally, instead of creating any new
private rights of action, depending on future interpretation, this legislation might
be read to actually immunize the rating agencies from tort liability stemming from
allegedly inaccurate ratings. 206
One sentence in this legislation states

being communicated from one person to another, and not the form of the
communication.
It is apparent, therefore, that bond ratings are indeed the world’s shortest
editorials. As editorials, courts should grant them the same deference they grant
any other protected first amendment publication. Ratings merely provide a
simple means for consumers to compare rough levels of risk among varying
companies and industries.
Husisian, supra note 33, at 454-55.
199
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689.
200
Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689 n.450 (citing Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs.,
Inc., 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007); Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs.,
Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp.
2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005); County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., Inc., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999);
Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004); LaSalle
Nat’l Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)) .
201
During these deliberations the agencies raised First Amendment objections which led to the
revision of an early version of the legislation. Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689-90. Even after the law
passed, the agencies still stuck to these objections.
202
Id. at 1690, n.453 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985)).
203
Some courts have noted that the “issuer pays” model is unlike ordinary journalists being paid by
a (hopefully) neutral party, while other courts have not. Kettering, supra note 66, at 1690, n.454 (citing
Commercial Fin. Servs., 94 P.3d at 110; LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F.
Supp. 1071, 1095-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). Another proposition is that rating agencies are associated with
the structuring of a transaction, therefore they are too dissimilar from common journalistic activity to
merit journalist legal protection. Id. at 1690-91 n.455 (citing In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 110-11
(2d. Cir. 2003).
204
Id. at 1688.
205
Id. at 1691.
206
The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act forecloses the argument that a rating agency’s
election to register as an NRSRO can be viewed as a waiver of any First Amendment protection that
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“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” no state or political subdivision
“may regulate the substance of credit ratings.”207 This sentence raises the question
of whether state law is preempted from extending application of ordinary tort law
to an allegedly inaccurate rating; whether it does will turn on the interpretation of
“regulat[ing] the substance” of a rating. 208
C. Barrier to Litigation: Complexity of the Ratings Process
In the past, the idea of holding ratings agencies to a negligence standard has
been proposed but issues have been raised. 209 One issue with attempting to litigate
with a negligence standard against the rating agencies is that securitization and the
ratings process is very complex and specialized. 210 Most jurors are unfamiliar with
the field, and would “have great difficulty distinguishing significant factors from
insignificant ones.” 211 Therefore any negligence standard may be difficult for an
agency to be held to because of the lack of clarity about what is reasonable, and
what is negligent. 212 Additionally, past commentators have stated the agencies
have a high degree of accuracy. 213 This accuracy, coupled with the inherent
complexity has resulted in a situation where only major instances of clear
negligence could be pursued. 214 Possible clear enough negligence has not existed,
until now.

might otherwise apply. Id. at 1691.
207
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §15E(c)(2) as added by the 2006 legislation. The statute reads
in full as follows:
Limitation--The rules and regulations that the Commission may prescribe
pursuant to this title, as they apply to nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations, shall be narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of this title
applicable to nationally recognized statistical rating organizations.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the Commission nor any
State (or political subdivision thereof) may regulate the substance of credit
ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally recognized
statistical rating organization determines credit ratings.
207
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §15E(c)(2) as added by the 2006 legislation. The statute reads
in full as follows:
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §15E(c)(2) (2008). After the legislation
had been reported out of committee, this sentence was slipped in through a
last-minute amendment, made on the Senate floor. Kettering, supra note
66, at 1688-89.
208
Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689. Language elsewhere by the same floor amendment preserves
the power of state securities commissions to bring enforcement actions against rating agencies with
respect to “fraud or deceit.” Id. This would seem to discourage a broad reading of “regulate the
substance.” Id. Additionally, congressional intent reflects a desire to impose some modest controls on
the rating agencies. Id. Nowhere does congressional intent approach the notion of awarding the rating
agencies immunity from any risk of tort liability on account of their ratings. Id. However, “plain
language” interpretation may promote this interpretation. Id.
209
Husisian, supra note 33, at 443.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
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D. Future Litigation
The SEC’s findings may set the stage for potential disclosure-related claims
by purchasers of subprime RMBS and CDOs against the rating agencies. 215
Failure by the agencies to disclose modeling risks or other practices may amount to
materially false or misleading statements. 216 Additionally, the numerous conflicts
of interest issues raised by the SEC could clearly weigh against the agencies. 217
Rating agencies will defend themselves by claiming they used proven
modeling, material process disclosure, and appropriate on-going surveillance. 218
They will also claim their models were valid and accurate when made, 219 and the
ensuing downgrades were due to market failure, coupled with appropriate
surveillance. 220 However, the notion of existence of appropriate surveillance seems
preposterous when it is considered that at least ten of the large companies that
failed or were bailed out in 2008 had investment grade ratings when they went
under. 221 It would seem ridiculous that an “appropriate surveillance” defense
could be used on far more complex securities if the agencies could not even
remotely accurately conduct surveillance on large companies with relatively
transparent books.
The defense that then-made assertions were valid and “no one could have
foreseen this” will probably be raised by many companies and individuals.
However, many people held positions where they were responsible for
understanding what they were analyzing. Their jobs as analysts were to literally
understand the risk. It would not seem incredulous that with even a small amount
of foresight all one of these individuals would have to do would be to realize that
lending to consumers was out of control and unsustainable, which would, in turn,
cause a decrease in the payouts of underlying securities and therefore a decline in
these securities’ respective values.
Investors may bring actions based on “information failures” under antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws. 222 These claims may or may not involve
fraud, depending on whether false or misleading representations are made with
215
Robert N. Rapp &. Scott C. Matasar, Commentary, Risk Modeling Implications for Potential
Rating Agency Liability to Purchasers of Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities, Sept. 30, 2008, 2008
Emerging Issues 2966 (LEXIS).
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. This will likely be a cry heard from many institutions. They may claim in collective unison
that “no one could have foreseen this.” However, many people held positions where they were
responsible for understanding what they were analyzing. Their jobs as analysts were to literally
understand risk. It would not seem incredulous that with even a small amount of foresight, only one of
these individuals would have to realize that lending to consumers was out of control and unsustainable,
which would, in turn, cause a decrease in the payouts of underlying securities and therefore a decline in
these securities respective value.
220
Id.
221
David Segal, Buffett Is Unusually Silent on Rating Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/business/18buffett.html.
222
Id. For these purposes the definition of information failure would be “an untrue statement of a
material fact or the omission to state a material fact such that a statement actually made is not
misleading.” Id.
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scienter. 223 Alternatively, when claiming information failures claimed under
sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities Act, scienter may not need to be shown
to recover. 224 These claims would include the ratings agencies with respect to
their positions as advisors in the public offering process. 225
Additionally, 15 U.S.C. § 77(l)(2) provides a “private right of action for a
purchaser of a security to recover from any person who sells the security by means
of a prospectus or oral statement in which there is an information failure.” 226
However, while there is also not a requirement for fraud or deception, there is a
reasonable care defense and a casual connection must be established between the
information failure and the purchaser’s loss. 227 The large problem here is that,
while the agencies may have been involved in the formation of the securities as
they took a hands-on approach to the structuring process, they were not involved in
the actual distribution or sale of the securities.228
Investors could also seek to recover under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 adopted under it. 229 However, under

223

Id. “Scienter” is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Id.
Id.
225
Id. The Securities Act of 1933 grants a right to action for purchasers and states:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved
that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may,
either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue . . . . [A]ny
person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has
with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation
which is used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the
statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to
have been prepared or certified by him.
15 U.S.C. 77k(a)(4) (2008) (emphasis added). This allows for a purchaser to recover without having to
show fraud or deception, but it does provide a due diligence defense. Rapp & Matasar, supra note 215.
226
Rapp & Matasar, supra note 215 (citing 15 U.S.C. 77(l)(2) (2009)).
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. Section 10b states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-- . . . .
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or
any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (2008). Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
224
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these antifraud provisions, there must be scienter to recover. 230 Scienter could
also be inferred. There are two interesting theories on inferring the proper scienter.
First, it could be argued that scienter could be inferred “at least in part from the
fact that rating agencies were paid by issuers in a competitive market to achieve
desired rating outcomes.” 231 Second, the agencies’ failure to disclose modeling
risk, especially in light of their use of out-of-model and undocumented
adjustments, could be used to infer scienter.232 The SEC’s report supports these
lines of reasoning by its clear showing of a lack of transparency at the agencies.233
Intent to deceive would be harder to prove especially as the agencies would
argue that their reputational values would have been on the line, and they of course
would not have wanted to risk that for something so fleeting as short-term profits.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Whether or not suits are brought, the system is clearly broken and the role of
the agencies is not clear. Currently, the agencies have the best of both worlds: they
issue ratings which must be observed according to regulation, and they also
maintain the defense that they merely issue non-binding “opinions” that investors
may or may not observe. With the government now taking a closer look at
increasing regulation across the board, there is increased possibility that the
NRSROs will perhaps be even more defined than the loose parameters set by the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. It is true the SEC has inquired into the
agencies’ actions. However, the SEC’s report on the agencies seems to handle
numerous and serious errors and omissions with kid gloves. It would seem, in
light of the financial crisis we face, that it is time to call a spade a spade and for the
government to intervene and allow organizations that created this mess to be
punished. This may not mean actual government sponsored prosecution against all
participants, but rather allowance of free market principles to work and weed out
the institutions that should fail. With regard to the rating agencies, the government
should take a more activist approach and allow the SEC real authority to take
action against the agencies. However, in the present case, this seems almost
impossible in light of the fact that NRSROs have had no regulation, so in effect
they have committed no sins.
To what standard can we hold organizations that are not subject to any
standards? It is here we face a choice to regulate or deregulate. Preferably, the
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
230
Rapp & Matasar, supra note 215. Scienter could be shown by “knowledge of false or
misleading information and intent to deceive, or by proof of reckless disregard for the truth of
information on which investors relied.” Id. It would seem that the SEC’s report would point at least to
this knowledge. Intent to deceive would be harder to prove, especially as the agencies would argue that
their reputational values would have been on the line, and they, of course, would not have wanted to
risk that for something so fleeting as short-term profits.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
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government would decrease its use of mandated reliance on the rating agencies’
ratings, which could open the door to competition and decreased reliance on the
big three agencies. However, if governments continue mandating the use of
ratings in globalized regulations, it would seem that increased regulation is a must.
Transparency is a start. If investors are to use ratings to attain and achieve
government recognized positions, then those investors must be able to clearly
understand what those ratings mean.
Allowing investors access to the
fundamentals of the ratings analysis and clarifying exactly what constitutes the
ratings themselves is imperative. This, however, is highly unlikely as the big three
agencies have a stranglehold on the rating market for which they will be loathe to
give up as there is sure to be increased competition with increased transparency.
Ironically, this seems negligible by the reputational element that the agencies
constantly remind us is their sole concern. For if reputation is what matters in this
game, why would investors want to use late entrants, even if these late entrants are
using similar ratings analysis? Another interesting twist is while governments may
choose to increase requirements for these agencies, what is the risk to those
governments? The agencies are so powerful that they can take even the mightiest
governments to their knees. 234 Will this prove to be a disincentive for
governments to impose any real regulation on the agencies? Only time will tell.
While the agencies have remained until now “litigation-proof,” it will remain
to be seen if this can continue. One interesting result of this current crisis is
increased awareness by the public-at-large of the way our economy works and its
key players to the economy. It would seem that lay people, who had no previous
interest, now have motivation to understand what happened to their retirement
accounts. Now appears to present a perfect storm of laypeople’s interest piqued in
complex financial instruments and finance market participant interactions. This
could lead to the ability, at least at some level, for lay persons to grasp the
intricacies necessary to hold rating agencies accountable. Even if the complexities
of the securitization processes are beyond jurors, now more than ever, jurors would
be more likely to side with injured plaintiffs against large recognizable entities
who contributed to the current international economic downfall. The rating
agencies seem perfect candidates as such entities. This may provide the incentive
for plaintiffs to test legal theories, such as “information failure,” on the agencies
and other key economic players. Where scienter is necessary, juries may be more
likely to infer it now.
After the disappointing SEC rule adoption on December 3, 2008, President
Barack Obama has called for increased government oversight of the rating
agencies. 235 Legislators seem to be paying attention and are introducing

234
See Bruner, supra note 6, at 141 (discussing the ill effects befalling Malaysia when it adopted
capital controls counter to the ratings agencies’ preference for none).
235
Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, supra note 72. President Obama’s
original transition team asked the Financial Economists Roundtable for its views on ratings reform. Id.
Later, in July 2009, President Obama released a rating agency reform plan. Ronald D. Orol, Obama
Releases Credit Rating Agencies Reform Plan, MARKETWATCH.COM, July 21, 2009, http://www.market
watch.com/story/obama-releases-credit-rating-agencies-reform-plan. The proposal included efforts to
limit conflicts of interest by “barring rating firms from consulting with companies they rate and
requiring corporations to disclose ‘pre-ratings’ obtained from credit rating agencies before a rating firm
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legislation aimed at reigning in the rating agencies. 236 States are exploring pursuit
of the agencies through criminal liability. 237 The SEC has shown increased
interest in the role of the rating agencies.238 Private money is finally taking strong
swings at the agencies. 239 Additionally, the creation of new competitive
alternatives to the big three is being explored. 240 Of course, the agencies are still
protesting increased oversight and defending their actions. 241 However, calls for
action by the public and private sectors will likely only increase as it is being
estimated that the failure of credit rating agencies in the recent financial crisis “will
cost the world economy as much as $3 trillion by the end of 2010.” 242 Whether
any of the recent momentum against the agencies will result in real changes
remains to be seen. 243 Perhaps soon, with increased scrutiny, these gatekeepers’

is selected to conduct a rating.” Id. This would give investors access to all the pre-ratings a corporation
received, thus eliminating (hopefully) “ratings shopping” by corporations and issuers. Id. The Proposal
also included the formation of a special office at the SEC to watch over rating agencies. Id.
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role for the future will become clearer.
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